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Some of the plainest axioms of free speech law are among those most widely
and unselfconsciously violated by reviewing courts. For example, courts often
ignore the claims of the common sense principle that the scope of application of
free speech protection should extend up to but not beyond the point where the
broad purposes or values arguably underlying the free speech clause are no
longer significantly implicated. Similarly, given the important interests in free
speech rights, responsible political experimentation, and the role of local demo-
cratic institutions, the courts should tend to defer to local elected officials on free
speech issues where, but only where, the local political decision-makers possess
the relevant, decisive comparative advantage with respect to the precise free
speech issue at hand.
These basic principles are commonly violated in areas such as obscenity and
pornography, but their widespread violation is perhaps most graphically seen in
the numerous recent cases discussing the free speech right claims of public
school students. This Article depicts the current judicial indifference to the
above principles in attempting to resolve the student speech cases and encour-
ages a movement toward greater fidelity to those principles.
I. CURRENT CASE LAW AND THE BACKGROUND OF FREE SPEECH VALUES
The judicial touchstone for the free speech rights of minor children in pub-
lic schools has of course been Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,1 in which several youngsters were disciplined for violating a
newly promulgated school rule that prohibited their wearing black armbands in
school. The Court held that a student in the position of the petitioners "may
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam,
if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the require-
* Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law.
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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ments of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without col-
liding with the rights of others." 2 The Court did little in Tinker to discourage
the assumption that both the "appropriate discipline" and "rights of others"
defenses to student speech claims would be construed rather narrowly. 3
The Court's interest in placing its decisions in this area in the context of
broad free speech values or purposes, or in confirming the correctness of its
analyses by means of linking its results to the promoting of such values, has been
limited. To the extent that the Court has attempted this task, it has resorted too
quickly to rhetoric and to platitudes. One widely cited, broadly inclusive formu-
lation of the values or aims sought to be achieved or protected through the free
speech clause holds that:
The values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of
expression may be grouped into four broad categories. Maintenance
of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring individual
self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method
of securing participation by the members of the society in social,
including political, decision-making, and (4) as maintaining the bal-
ance between stability and change in the society. 4
Other widely recognized formulations differ as to emphasis, 5 and some are sig-
nificantly narrower, 6 but none is significantly more expansive or inclusive. 7 Our
thesis in this regard is that in an ordinary Tinker-type student speech case, and
in a variety of related cases, elected school officials or their agents could reason-
ably feel that any judicially recognized free speech goals or values would not be
subjected to a significant net impairment by the most common and moderate
sorts of restrictions and sanctions imposed upon student speech.
With respect to the value of individual self-fulfillment, Professor Emerson
has argued that this concern is derived from the basic premise that "the proper
end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human
being."s He explained that "expression is an integral part of the development of
ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self. The power to realize
his potentiality as a human being begins at this point and must extend at least
this far if the whole nature of man is not to be thwarted." 9 While this formula-
2. Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (brackets in
Tinker).
3. See id. at 513. The Court's most recent examination of these broad issues was in Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
4. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 878-79
(1963).
5. See, e.g., Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 521.
6. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61-75 (1975); A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 26-27, 79-80 (1965); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 23-25 (1971).
7. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964
(1978); Bloustein, The Origin, Validity, and Interrelationships of the Political Values Served by
Freedom of Expression, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 372 (1981); Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay
on Theory and Doctrine, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1137 (1983); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
8. Emerson, supra note 4, at 879.
9. Id.
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tion is certainly broad enough to implicate a variety of forms of student speech
within public schools, the difficulty is that just these sorts of developmental and
self-realizational aims are a major element of public school education itself, in
general, and of each of the constituents of its curriculum, however defined. At a
minimum, a public school could responsibly take such a view.
If so, why should an alleged free speech right of students, insofar as it
depends solely on a self-fulfillment value argument, be thought to override the
school's authorized pursuit of just this value through its broader curriculum
and its individual components? Individual capacity development through wear-
ing a politically expressive armband in math class might well be thought, on
some reasonable pedagogy, to conflict with or distract full attention from the
equally important individual capacity- developmental function of exploring the
basic principles of mathematics. If all are agreed on the importance of free
speech and its underlying values or purposes, the federal courts do not appear to
have any clear comparative advantage over locally elected decision-makers in
ascertaining the best mix of school activities for promoting self-realization and
development.
The question has been posed: "Should the primary goal of education be to
enhance the self-realization of the student or to mold the student to advance the
common goals of society?"o This apparent antinomy is, at least for our pur-
poses, resolvable. The approach to student speech issues elaborated and
defended below would first require the minimal showing that the challenged
restriction promotes some legitimate pedagogical goal sought by the relevant
school officials. It would also require a showing that the challenged restriction is
not crucially inconsistent with or destructive of the broad development, growth,
and flourishing of the student's capacities for individual self-realization as a
future adult possessed of mature and developed free speech capacities.
It is easy to suppose, and perhaps even correct, that "free speech plays an
important role in the child's development .... ," I1 It may even play an indispen-
sable role. But this is not to show that there must or should be a judicially
enforceable right of the minor student to speak out on most or each of the par-
ticular occasions on which the student might seek to assert such a right. We
should recognize instead, in the public school child, a presently enforceable free
speech right prohibiting restrictions imposed by the school in such a way as to
significantly impair, inhibit, or otherwise "stunt" the development of the stu-
dent's future free speech-relevant capacities as an adult. But this right does not
logically require that the child in effect be granted a constitutional right to par-
ticipate in determining, unconstrainedly, the public school's broad curriculum in
particular respects. Under our constitutional standard, a school generally is not
barred from determining that students obtain ample practice and experience in
speaking freely in non-school environments. It may even operate on the theory
that certain sorts of regimentation, control, and hierarchical discipline within
school may tend to produce graduates who are more generally free speech com-
petent, in the sense that they have more fully, openly, and adaptably developed
their capacities for logical thought, and organized, persuasive presentation,
10. Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual
Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1649 (1986).
11. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 338 (1979).
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based on a storehouse of arguably relevant information, than their peers edu-
cated along more permissive lines.
The availability of an option of intramural dissent or insurgency simply is
not a necessary inference from an assumed value of individuality or distinctive-
ness. 12 A child can be "different" or "unique" in respects chosen by the child,
and can display those qualities, on all or selected occasions, even if the class-
room agenda-sharing option is foreclosed to the student. Not every broad rejec-
tion of Tinker logically implies totalitarianism. Being precluded from wearing a
political armband in class does not preclude one from wearing such an armband
elsewhere, thereby manifesting one's uniqueness, or from wearing one as an
adult, after, if not before, the "due study and preparation"1 3 valued by John
Stuart Mill. Partisans of the value of individual self-realization or autonomy
should recognize, as well, that such a value, however reasonably broadly con-
ceived, may not do all the work expected of it in other respects. Autonomy does
not necessarily require a particularly broad ranging education, or exposure to a
nearly infinite set of ideas, or the ability to think constructively within all such
areas. 14
Finally, it should be noted that a high percentage of the litigated cases,
perhaps not surprisingly, fail to implicate significantly the value of individual
autonomy for another reason. In Tinker, the petitioners were sixteen, fifteen,
and thirteen years of age at the time of the political expression in question,' 5 and
apparently were, quite naturally and understandably, deeply influenced in this
regard by their own highly motivated parents. 16 This is not to suggest that
speech with clear causal motivations must be constitutionally trivial, but that
merely reflecting, in some less developed, less articulate way, the convictions or
example of one's parents is no more evidence of the child's individual autonomy
than would be the child's acting, more or less reflectively, on the basis of lessons
imparted or inculcated through school.
A similar analysis may be made of the separate value or purpose of the free
speech clause that invokes the importance of democratic self-government and
the participation in that process.' 7 Given the range of curricular, extra-curricu-
lar, and non-school vehicles for a child's developing the social, cognitive, and
forensic skills necessary to prepare the child in a minimally adequate way, the
school system can easily argue that to effectuate this value it will virtually never
be required to allow the child to unsolicitedly speak her mind on any particular
current social issue. Ultimately, collective self-government is perhaps a crucial
political aim of the public school educational process.18 This does not explain,
however, why a Court that ordinarily professes deference on matters of the prac-
tical soundness and efficacy of educational practices should assume, without
constitutionally permitting local experimentation, that the best overall practical
preparation for each child's future participation in self-government as an adult,
12. Cf id. at 347 (seeking to tie individuality to the possibility of defiance of authority).
13. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 275 (B. Wishy ed. 1959).
14. See Gardner, Liberty and Compulsory Education, in OF LIBERTY 109, 126 (A.P. Griffiths
ed. 1983).
15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
16. See id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 11, at 338.
18. See, e.g., Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
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must involve in some primitively analogous way, broad free speech rights as a
school-child.
There is certainly unassailable logic to the recognition that " '[i]t would be
foolhardy to shield our children from political debate and issues until the eve of
their first venture into the voting booth. Schools must play an essential role in
preparing their students to think and analyze and to recognize the dema-
gogue.' "19 We may stipulate that parents, along with institutions other than
schools cannot discharge this burden alone, at least in certain respects. But it is
simply not credible that a student's later-manifested ability as an adult to cast an
intelligent vote, intelligently discharge the obligations of citizenship generally, or
exercise reasonably fully and unconstrainedly, what we have referred to as fully
developed free speech capacities, depends upon the student's being granted the
initiative and latitude implied by Tinker and its progeny. Or so a school system
might quite reasonably conclude. A school might reasonably determine that a
student's future prowess in demagogue-recognition, or in intelligent exercise of
free speech rights generally, depends significantly not upon Tinker-type activi-
ties, but upon such mundane capacities as the ability to draw in an analytical,
incisive way, upon a reasonably rich storehouse of presumably basic historical
and social factual knowledge, data, and theories.
Of course, freedom of speech is often thought to have underpinnings not
only in the value of self-governance, but in its "truth detection" or "truth attain-
ment" function. 20 In this regard, Justice Black urged that "[t]he original idea of
schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned as worthless or out of date, was
that children had not yet reached the point of experience and wisdom which
enabled them to teach all of their elders." 21 However curmudgeonly we may
regard such pronouncements, it could reasonably be concluded that the wearing
of armbands by the protestors in Tinker, aggregated across thousands or mil-
lions of sympathizers, would not have materially furthered our collective insight
into the practical or moral dimensions of the Vietnam conflict, or otherwise
given us access, potentially, to some "truth" about the conflict that we as a
society did not already possess. This is partly because children tend to not be at
the cutting edge of truth or insight into geopolitical issues, even of complex
moral dimension, and partly because armbands, for example, tend, by virtue of
their very nature, not to be very detailed, articulate, convincing, or "insightful."
Hence, they are severely limited as new truth-conveyance devices, or as articu-
late challenges to received wisdom. Much the same could be said of most of the
other familiar media of symbolic political protest.
One writer, paralleling the democratic self-government function argument,
while conceding the normal immaturity of judgment of minor children, has
maintained that "[g]uaranteeing the child's right of free speech ...plays an
instrumental role in advancing the search for knowledge and truth; the benefits
do not accrue immediately, but neither can they be secured by sheltering the
child until he is ready to join the adult community." 22 We have addressed the
analogue of this argument in other contexts above, and we need not recast those
19. Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (quoting
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972)).
20. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 4, at 878-79; see also J.S. MILL, supra note 13.
21. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting).
22. Garvey, supra note 11, at 344.
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arguments at this point. Suffice it to say that disagreeing with the result in cases
like Tinker does not commit anyone to relevantly "sheltering" the student. The
fallacy involved is in assuming the indispensability of the early and arguably
superficial mimicry of a practice if the practice is ever to be later grasped as an
adult. Our society does not mandate, for example, that because we want an
ample supply of competent physicians in the future, we must now allow young
schoolchildren to attempt or simulate simple actual diagnosis and treatment,
perform fake or actual surgeries with appropriate safeguards, or prescribe
(harmless) drugs, and so forth. Instead, we teach the young schoolchildren, who
must in some proportion later become physicians, solely through basic educa-
tion, acquisition of basic social skills, and through the authoritative inculcation
of the principles of biology, chemistry, and so forth.
Thus, taken in this context, it is simply not true, or a reasonable democrati-
cally elected school system might well suppose it not to be true, that it is "cru-
cial that the student learn by taking part in actual disputes that count for
something." 23 Presumably, however, most defenders of broad free speech rights
of public school students will have little general use for an "actually counting"
standard; our natural impulse may be to say that many or most student elections
that such persons would want to see broadly protected with respect to student
speech do not actually "count for something" in any relevant sense.
In sum, it appears that the values underlying the free speech clause are, in
this particular context, served at least equally and as well by non-school exper-
iences and by school experiences, including listening to and speaking with fellow
students, not dependent upon the kinds of student speech rights argued for or
extended in cases like Tinker. Even if this were not so, it remains true because of
age and immaturity that "[t]he ability of the child to influence the actions of the
state through the political process and to reshape his own life as a result of
information obtained through the first amendment is severely limited." 24
II. TOWARD A SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT OF RELEVANT
CAPACITY STANDARD
While many of the student speech cases have been influenced by the meta-
phor of the classroom as peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas," 25 we have seen
that much or all of the value logic underlying that metaphor, is simply not nec-
essarily and significantly implicated by many litigated speech restrictions
imposed on public school students. Moreover, free speech values can be as fully
recognized and effectuated despite, or even because of, those restrictions.
We have thus far no reason to question the constitutionality of the view that
"[t]he student and the student's parent should be able to feel that the school-
room will not be bombarded by unsolicited and unplanned events, ideas, and
activities." 26 While student speech, for example, asserting that a principal is a
liar or a racist may, controversially, serve some useful educational function in
23. Id. at 361.
24. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial
Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477, 488-89 (1981).
25. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Fraser v. Bethel School Dist.
No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
26. Diamond, supra note 24, at 493.
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certain respects, 27 not all such speech acquires constitutional protection through
its mere arguable utility, even if its utility bears upon recognized free speech
values. On our view, then, there may be merit to according recognition and
weight to the possibilities of non-physical disruption or distraction in a school or
classroom.28 Therefore, loss of authoritative control of the educational agenda,
assuming a legitimate state interest in preventing such loss, need not be constitu-
tionally mandated in Tinker-type situations. But there must of course be limits,
drawn from the free speech clause, to the authority of even democratically
elected school officials to keep their students in blissful ignorance, to maliciously
or complacently flout or ignore free speech values, or to impose a thoroughgoing
tyranny within a public school system.
The logical standard to impose in public school speech cases involving
minors stems from the conclusion that while the speech of minors in Tinker-type
cases does not significantly and uniquely implicate recognized free speech values,
it is axiomatic that comparable sorts of general restrictions imposed on adults in
general would clearly implicate such free speech values, and normally would be
justifiably struck down on free speech grounds. As we will discuss at greater
length below, there is plainly something constitutionally distinctive about adult
status and adult activities pertaining to free speech. The free speech standard
imposed within the public schools should accommodate that important differ-
ence. It should aim at preserving, for the future adults that the young students
will eventually become, the range and depth and value of the free speech rights
that such future adults might choose to exercise.
We thus argue for a "significant impairment of relevant capacity" standard.
By this we mean that school officials should, under the free speech clause, be
liable in principle for the presumably rare instances in which a school system,
through action or inaction, has the proximate effect of significantly impairing or"stunting" a student's development, which it is instead constitutionally bound to
reasonably assist. It is the school system's duty to further such students' social,
intellectual, forensic, and other capacities necessary to or constitutive of the
overall capacity to make reasonably effective use of an adult's free speech rights.
Taken together, such capacities can be referred to simply as a person's "free
speech capacities."
We require "significant" impairment partly to reduce indirectly obvious
measurement problems. We are proposing, in effect, that a child be given a cause
of action for what she will be like several years in the future, unless somehow
perhaps rescued or restored and reclaimed. For practical reasons, we perhaps
may want to toll the statute of limitations in such cases at least until the plain-
tiff's adulthood. These practical problems appear neither insurmountable, nor
without broad precedent in areas such as personal injury tort law or the law of
damages measurement.
While "impairment" implies a relational standard, or at least a comparison
to some actual or hypothetical unimpaired condition, recognition of significant
impairment in free speech capacities does not seem deeply metaphysical or even
unduly complex. It is largely a matter of common sense and common observa-
tion. In the case of otherwise normal, healthy persons, unimpairment in our
27. See Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School As An Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 278, 287 (1970).
28. Note the analysis of the case facts in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517-18 (Black, J., dissenting).
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sense is essentially a matter of some reasonable, reasonably broad, adaptable
fluency and skill in the free speech capacities. It is exemplified in such activities
as gathering information, reasoning, reflecting and judging, and in forming and
modifying principles and conclusions, as well as in persuading others, as com-
pared with the level of comparable skills exhibited in the real world or on test
scores by the broad range of one's peers, who have experienced the range of
contemporary public and private educational systems. In the case of students
who have been educated in more than one school district, each district individu-
ally should bear responsibility for not irresponsibly certifying the student for the
next grade level in the absence of the student's having the free-speech capacity
skills minimally appropriate to the grade level in question.
We have not insisted, as constitutionally mandated, upon the public
schools' maximization or optimization of the development of their students' free
speech capacities, manifested later, as adults. The maximization standard would
controversially exalt the free speech clause above other, arguably equally consti-
tutionally fundamental values, and might require some unnerving costs and
tradeoffs. The "optimization" standard, while in one respect unassailable as a
matter of abstract logic, would seem practically unascertainable and unenforce-
able judicially. If we retreat to "rough optimization" we have returned to a
zone-of-reasonableness standard.
Among the features and implications of this standard is its focus on effects,
and not on the difficult to prove, and often irrelevant, motivation, intent, or
purpose of the school in imposing its speech restraints. If the effect is one of
relevant significant impairment, the school's purpose is of limited interest. 29
This follows not just from the language and logic of the free speech clause, but
specifically from the fact that free speech values can be damagingly impaired in
the absence of any sort of malice.
More importantly, this standard can presumably be met even though the
school system, whether inevitably or maliciously, omits or otherwise "sup-
presses" classroom presentation or discussion of certain disfavored subjects or
ideas. It is simply implausible to imagine that any student will necessarily suffer
significant impairment in future free speech capacity because she was denied,
until the age of majority, classroom exposure to some perspective on the New
Deal, or fascism, or affirmative action, and where she would not have suffered
such capacity impairment had she been so exposed. Of course, certain content-
based or viewpoint-based omissions or other curricular choices-for example,
professions of racial supremacy-may raise or avoid issues of independent con-
stitutional rights, including that of equal protection of the laws for all students.
Similarly, we treat establishment clause and free exercise of religion questions as
without significant impact on our major theses.
The questions of socialization and indoctrination, of value inculcation, and
of coercion, are important in our context, and are discussed below. It must be
admitted at the outset, however, that our future capacity impairment test seems
compatible with at least some limited attempt on the part of the school system to
undertake the occasionally constitutionally suspect goal of fostering a "homoge-
29. Cf Justice Blackmun's concurrence in the library book removal case of Board of Educ.,
Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879-82 (1982) (focusing on the
school authorities' intent in removing the books) and the discussion of Justice Blackmun's approach
in Levin, supra note 10, at 1659.
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neous" people. 30 But there are limits to the school's authority, independent of
any separate equal protection challenge. On our theory, the homogenization of
minor public school students, whether intentional or inadvertent, may not take
the form of, or lead to, significant future capacity impairment of the kind we
have described.
Without delving immediately into the broader issues of coercion and indoc-
trination, it is possible to differentiate quickly our view from the theory that
courts should interfere with public school officials' curricular or instructional
choices "only in those rare instances when decisions of state and school officials
are based upon narrow political, partisan, or religious considerations." 3 1 Reli-
gious issues aside, our focus would instead be on the possibility of significant
future free speech capacity impairment in the absence of this sort of narrow
partisanship. Such capacity impairment does not become constitutionally per-
missible merely because it reflects some neutral, even-handed inadequacy on the
part of the schools.
On the other hand, it might be wondered whether all narrowly politically
motivated instructional decisions should be vulnerable under the free speech
clause if there is no relevant capacity impairment, no equal protection issues,
and no religion clause problems. It should be noted that narrow indoctrination
need not be effective, and even if temporarily effective, need not be permanently
so, or leave some permanent detectable impact. 32 Effects of narrow classroom
partisanship, other than generating undesired widespread skepticism and debate
outside of class, may essentially "wash out" by the time of adulthood, the earli-
est time, on our theory, for full and independent free speech significance. If such
effects do not so wash out by the constitutionally relevant moment, the analysis
moves to that of considering whether any relevant capacity impairment is
present.
This is not to suggest that the rights of students or parents under the reli-
gion or equal protection clauses never impinge upon a free speech analysis, on
our theory. Were a public school to even covertly communicate an agenda of,
say, racial hierarchism, this would be subject to objection not only on the basis
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, 33 but on grounds rele-
vant to our free speech analysis. We might draw, in at least a loose way, on the
judicial sociology of cases such as Brown v. Board of Education 34 for the propo-
sition that such "teaching" may have the long-term effect, whether intended or
not, of dampening or impairing the development of the future free speech capac-
ities of disfavored and subordinated groups of students.
Similarly, it is intriguing to ask, the religion clauses utterly aside, about the
free speech status of a public high school that, standing the case of Wisconsin v.
Yoder 35 on its head, insisted on teaching its students only in accord with the
30. Cf Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (repudiating such a policy goal). See also Diamond, supra note
24, at 481.
31. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School
Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 49 (1984).
32. Cf id. at 52. (recognizing the dangers of indoctrination, but not discussing the possibility of
the fading or superseding of such influence over time).
33. Cf id. at 55 (discussing the inculcation of doctrines of racial hierarchism).
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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secular implications of Old Order Amish doctrine. There is at least some sup-
port in the descriptions of those tenets in Yoder for contrary views as to whether
such a regime would violate a student's free speech rights on our relevant capac-
ity impairment test. No significant such impairment need follow if such a school
were merely to emphasize self-reliance and manual work, and to de-emphasize,
as opposed to largely ignoring, "intellectual and scientific accomplishments,
self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other
students." 36
But plainly, to proceed too far in this direction, or to "insulate" students
"from the modem world" 37 risks largely disabling students in relevant respects,
and making their stance of aloofness and political silence an involuntary one.
To go this far is to fail the free speech test we have proposed.
III. THE NATURE OF CHILDHOOD EDUCATION AND
CHILDREN'S SPEECH RIGHTS
While there are many questions yet unanswered, a tentative conclusion that
may be drawn is that just as a parent's forcing or indoctrinating the minor child
to wear a protest symbol to school would not, ordinarily, be significantly
destructive of future free speech capacity, 38 neither, ordinarily, would a contrary
requirement by the public school that the child not wear such a symbol to class.
Conclusions of this sort are best reconciled on the basis of the recognition, sub-
scribed to by a majority of the Supreme Court in at least some contexts, 39 that
public school education is not simply a matter of the Romantic, spontaneous,
unaided natural blossoming of latent abilities, but is largely characterizable as a
period of broad preparation and value transfer.
Even in the Tinker case itself, Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion
sought to hold open the possibility of drawing crucial distinctions between
adults and minor children.40 He did so on the grounds of the permissibility of a
state's determining that the latter are "not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guaran-
tees." 41 This formulation is undoubtedly on the right track, but there is a cer-
tain unsatisfactoriness with it in that such schoolchildren are undeniably
possessed of a full and richly developed capacity for vehement, if occasionally
grossly immature and insensitive, choice and expression of preference.
Perhaps one social point in frustrating the preferences of schoolchildren to"speak" politically in class, at least on some occasions, is to ensure that there are
first imparted important lessons in perspective, diplomacy and tact, dispassion-
36. Id. at 211.
37. Id. at 210.
38. Cf. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 646 (discussing the rights of parents
to exercise control in this respect over their children).
39. See, e.g., Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
40. Professor Tushnet maintains that, with specified qualifications, "[t]he first amendment
rights of young adults in schools are, according to Tinker, exactly the same as those of adults."
Tushnet, Free Expression and the Young Adult: A Constitutional Framework, 1976 ILL. L. FORUM
746, 760.
41. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in result)).
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ateness in analysis, and the potential range and depth of relevant evidence when
making political choices. This would include such matters as the admittedly
non-disruptive, but potentially harmful, "wounding" effect of speech on some of
one's fellow students, on emotional subjects, even if the speaker has not intended
such an effect. It should be uncontroversial that "[w]ithout any formal school-
ing, children will be incapable of intelligently exercising their civil or political
rights within our society." 42 Relatedly, "[c]hildren develop from incapacity
toward capacity." 43 The practical order of things is one of childhood incapacity
to exercise free speech rights until capacity is developed, as children "are not
adults in miniature"" even for our purposes. The burden of showing impair-
ment by the school, of otherwise flourishing capacities, naturally rests on the
claimant.
On our theory, minor students are in the relevant respects not finished
products, but radically undeveloped. 4 5 This is not to suggest that children are
not ends-in-themselves for ethical purposes. Even children may suffer unjustifi-
able affronts to their moral dignity. But childhood, particularly in the school
context, is a stage of crucial preparation, with a sense of essential preliminari-
ness. As we have seen, in matters of free speech, any rights of the student exist
to "point toward" those of the future adult.
Of course, there is a certain roughness in choosing, as we have, either
attaining the age of majority or graduation from high school as the appropriate
boundary markers. But there is a clear conceptual logic to these lines of demar-
cation,46 and we may well not wish to pay exorbitant administrative costs associ-
ated with more precise, individualized determinations of the emotional, social,
moral, and intellectual development of student plaintiffs, or potential plaintiffs. 4 7
It is of course possible to argue that there is some better dividing line, such as
entry into high school, or entry into one's senior year in high school, even if it is
recognized that the privileged speech of persons in the more mature category
within the school may tend to unpredictably affect younger attending the same
school. The argument has been made, as we noted above, that "[r]ealistically,
high school students are beyond the point of being sheltered .... "48
Literally, the argument appears to be that high school students are practi-
cally unshelterable. This is implausibly extreme. A high school might well be
reasonably effective in banning the wearing of offensive insignia. If instead the
argument concerns the desirability of some degree of such sheltering, then it
repeats claims confronted throughout this Article. If there is in fact a babel of
voices, some unruly and irresponsible, outside of school, it does not follow, as a
42. Gutmann, Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 338, 349 (1980).
43. Hafen, supra note 38, at 648.
44. Id. at 651 (quoting J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 13 (1973)).
45. Cf. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165 (discussing the need for appropriate examples and role models
for children in schools).
46. Professor Levin has discussed several cases in the establishment clause area that contrast the
presumed maturity and skepticism of college students with the presumed greater impressionability
of high school students. See Levin, supra note 10, at 1678 n.164.
47. See Tushnet, supra note 40, at 750.
48. Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1363, rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
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constitutional requirement, that a public high school may not seek authorita-
tively to achieve a somewhat different mix and range of voices within its walls
without defaulting on its obligation to prepare students for the world outside.
The alternative dividing line of senior status in high school is suggested by
the remark of Judge Rosenn to the effect that:
A decision to limit the exposure of young adolescents, who have
less developed critical skills, to works such as Mein Kampf, which
express an ideology that school administrators find abhorrent,
should normally remain undisturbed .... The same would not be
true if the students in question were high school seniors.4 9
This may be taken to recommend a dividing line between eleventh and twelfth
grades, even if we are not to accord any "unlimited" exposure rights to the
twelfth graders. The administrative burden on school officials at this point may
be large, though, even assuming that the difference in the average level of critical
skills between eleventh and twelfth graders is particularly significant, or that
some particular threshold is ordinarily not passed until entry into twelfth
grade.50
Precise boundary issues aside, the decisive relevance of age to the appropri-
ate scope of liberty was recognized by John Stuart Mill in the context of his
discussion of limiting governmental coercion to the prevention of harm to
others: "It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties."51 Mill continues
to the effect that "[w]e are not speaking of children or of young persons below
the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood" 52
The developed ability to reason and exercise self-control is arguably essen-
tial to the broader system of political freedom generally. 53 Those abilities
depend upon age and education, including certain educational or curricular
restraints that may be necessary for the child's free speech capacities to develop.
While the untutored and the intellectually undernourished person may indeed be
free from many constraints to do many valued things,54 she must lack the pres-
ently reasonably developed capacity to exercise the range of skills that comprises
the unconstrained exercise of freedom of speech.
Public schoolchildren are in this respect relevantly differently situated from
adults, whether the adults in question are at liberty or under constraint. Age
matters in the ironic sense that even where we recognize that a given adult is
dramatically impaired in free speech capacities, due perhaps to illiteracy, we do
not compulsorily arrange for such an adult to be placed, against his will, in a
position where he can take more effective advantage of his free speech rights.55
This is undoubtedly true largely for a variety of practical reasons, but also in
49. Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 220 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
50. For a possible distinction in a somewhat different context between the first amendment
rights of "older" versus "younger" minors or juveniles, see American Booksellers Ass'n v. Comm. of
Va., 792 F.2d 1261, 1264 n.7 (4th Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3569 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1987) (No. 86-1034).
51. J.S. MILL, supra note 13, at 251; Gardner, supra note 14, at 117.
52. J.S. MILL, supra note 13, at 251. See also Hafen, supra note 38, at 612.
53. See Gardner, supra note 14, at 112.
54. See id. at 114.
55. See id. at 109.
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part because of respect for the dignity of choices made by a person of the requi-
site age.
It is certainly possible to analogize the status of public school students to
that of prisoners,5 6 even if prisoners are restrained in their liberties all of the
time, unlike students.5 7 From our perspective, the crucial disanalogy is that
schools are or ought to be constitutionally required, in our contexts, to give
crucial weight to the future capacities of students and to their development, or
to the students' future selves generally, in loose analogy to a constitutionally
required focus on their "rehabilitation" or rescue from initial ignorance and lack
of competence, whereas prisons can ordinarily, and constitutionally, focus more
exclusively on the prisoner's own past - the retributive and vindictive functions
- or on the present welfare of third parties, as where a prisoner may, if released,
pose an immediate threat to the safety of particular persons, or of society in
general.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY LEGITIMATE FUNCTIONS
OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
There is an obvious, never fully resolvable constitutional tension between
the public schools as an instrument in the process of intergenerational transmis-
sion of culture-the process of teaching-and the schools as potential sources of
narrow, perhaps coercive, indoctrination causing negative effects that may con-
tinue into adulthood. Judicially, it has been maintained that "[t]here is no doubt
as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citi-
zens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic edu-
cation."58 Similarly, the Court has concluded that "public schools are vitally
important 'in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,' and as
vehicles for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a
democratic political system.' 59 Apparently, that process need not be confined
to values explicitly prescribed by the Constitution. In Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters,60 the Court, though certainly in dicta at best, undoubtedly saw nothing
constitutionally amiss with a state requirement that teachers be of "patriotic
disposition." 6 1 Presumably such a disposition would often tend to reflect itself
in one's teaching, and perhaps even in one's grading of students.
Constitutionally, the public school need not be essentially an extension of
parental control in the value inculcation process. It has been sensibly argued
that "the public school system is not merely a mechanism that translates the will
of the parent into the upbringing of the individual child; it is also a mechanism
that instills in the child the collective societal values of the community."62 On
our theory, of course, the schools constitutionally must do more, perhaps to the
56. See Diamond, supra note 24, at 517 n.181.
57. See id.
58. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
59. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68,
76-77 (1979)).
60. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
61. Id. at 534.
62. Diamond, supra note 24, at 494 n.86. For a discussion of the moral rights of children with
respect particularly to their parents, see D. PHILLIPS, TOWARD A JUST SOCIAL ORDER 159-83
(1986).
August 1987]
NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW
detriment of the above goals. The schools must, for example, work to provide
students with the eventual capacity to do such things as defend or oppose many
of those parental and collective societal values. 63
There is judicial authorization as well for an additional role for the schools.
The Court has authorized value inculcation, at least within certain limits. We
have argued for reading the free speech clause as mandating what might be
called rights- exercise preparation. But relatedly, it has been contended that
those who nurture and direct the destiny of the child have "the right, coupled
with the high duty to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 64
We have not similarly emphasized any duty of preparation for future obliga-
tions, since our focus has not been on the possibility of overriding any prima
facie speech rights of students by means of the school's showing an inconsistent
compelling state interest not otherwise attainable. There is undoubtedly some
overlap in concern, though, as it is doubtful that a person could discharge well
the range of citizenship obligations if her schooling were such as to impair signif-
icantly her free speech capacities.
Our view thus falls between that adopted by two major contending camps.
Those who accord relatively great latitude to school authorities have argued that
"[t]he board, the principals, and the teachers may select a textbook favoring
their own views and ideologies, and they might not permit alternatives." 6 5 This
result may to some degree be simply unavoidable, but within the limits implied
by our discussion above, it is permissible.
A variant of this latitudinarian approach argues for a constitutionally privi-
leged status for inculcating "constitutionally recognized fundamental values
while refusing to permit the study of beliefs contrary to those values." 66 Again,
this may, up to a point, be permissible on our capacity impairment theory. But
the practical and logical questions raised by this variant are intriguing. It can be
argued, for example, that one unimpeachable constitutional value, in some sense,
is the institutional process for the supersession and replacement of constitutional
values, as in the supplanting of the equal protection values of Plessy v. Fergu-
son 6 7 with those of Brown v. Board of Education.68 There is thus a paradox in
pedagogically closing the class of constitutionally recognized values. If it is
replied that both Plessy and Brown in fact uphold the same constitutional value,
that of equal protection of the laws, then very little will count as a change in
constitutional values.
On any of the latitudinarian theories, there must be some account of how
one can clearly inculcate a particular favored value without simultaneously
exposing the students to the value's opposite. The more serious problem for
these theories, though, is posed by the other extreme to which our theory stands
as a midpoint. The antithesis of the latitudinarian or inculcationist theories is
constituted by writers who argue that "the courts have inadequately protected
the interests of students in freedom of belief and have granted too much weight
63. None of this is to suggest, certainly, that the formal learning process is of only instrumental
value, or that education is not worthwhile for its own sake. Cf. Gardner, supra note 14, at 127.
64. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), quoted in Hafen, supra note 38, at 620.
65. Diamond, supra note 24, at 497.
66. Freeman, supra note 31, at 56.
67. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
68. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to government's claimed interest in inculcating and indoctrinating youth."6 9
This more restrictive approach is based on liberal principles and the obser-
vation that there are no uniformly acceptable political values. 70 In the absence
of any universal current consensus on which values are genuinely fundamental
democratic values, "to authorize government to inculcate 'fundamental demo-
cratic' values is to authorize those in power to pick and choose the versions of
the values that serve their interests." 7! On this more restrictive approach, the
courts should on principle bar any attempt by the public schools to impose on
students any set of political ideas, values, attitudes, or beliefs. 72 The rationale
underlying this approach is that a government that is to be subject to the genu-
ine control of the electorate cannot have the authority to determine, partly
through the public schools, the values and preferences of that electorate with
respect to the government, lest democracy be merely a vicious circle. 73
Rooted as such a conception is in one version of liberal individualism, one is
tempted to respond to such restrictive approaches not on the level of its ethical
soundness, but that of cultural anthropology. Is it not simply asking too much
of any reasonably vital, self-assured, reasonably decent society that it be so
remarkably different as to jeopardize its own perpetuation or its own continuity
in even a general way by foreswearing an arguably vital means of political social-
ization? Will a society that is so scrupulously indifferent as to its advertisement
to the succeeding generation not simply tend to be replaced on the world stage
by societies less attractive by our own current majority's standards and most of
our own received traditions? Particularly in light of a variety of private school
options, 74 and in light of the relative uncontroversiality of certain basic political
concepts, such as free speech for adults, the absence of an established church,
broad civil tolerance, and opposition to explicit racism, we are naturally reluc-
tant to grant a public school curricular veto to dissenters on such issues, beyond
their ability to convince us of our error. On the strict logic of such a restrictive
position, it cannot countenance the teaching, or "inculcation," if there is any
difference, of the particular value of individual dignity. Not all subscribe to it.
On our theory, such value inculcation is permissible, at least under the free
speech clause, up until the point of significant future free speech capacity
impairment.
There is, finally, for the restrictive approach to public school value trans-
mission, the deeper practical problem of how a reflective citizen, reasonably
open and unconstrained in her thinking, is actually produced. For an adult to be
knowledgeable and critically insightful about her society, it may be that, con-
trary to what is permissible on the restrictive approaches, some degree of value
inculcation as a schoolchild is practically required, permanent or not.
69. VanGeel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Government Authority to Inculcate Youth,
62 TEX. L. REV. 197, 203 (1983).
70. See Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 1104, 1134 (1979); See also Levin, supra note 10, at 1653 (discussing Professor
Kamenshine's argument).
71. VanGeel, supra note 69, at 250.
72. See id. at 239.
73. See id. at 249-50.
74. Professor VanGeel cites a figure of 11% private school attendance as of 1983. Id. at 283
n.386.
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Professor Ackerman has assumed, quite plausibly, an infant's practical need
for "cultural coherence." 75 Moreover, perhaps at some loss in obvious plausibil-
ity, it seems that a public school education in social matters that is, simply an
unordered, kaleidescopic presentation of a succession of views, theories, and
unendorsed value assertions, without any authoritative context, may tend to
leave the student simply dismayed, without any coherent standpoint at all - not
even a reflective, well-articulated relativism or skepticism. If so, it seems that
the restrictive approach to value inculcation, which of course might also take the
chimerical course of attempting to utterly exclude all values from the school,
might itself be unconstitutional on our theory, as resulting in significant free
speech capacity impairment. Relatedly, it should be noted that sanitizing the
schools of all illicit value communication, even if this were possible, would for
another reason not inevitably lead to an unquestionable enhancement of the
child's autonomy and political freedom.7 6 Certainly, some parents are them-
selves afflicted with something of the dictator's ambitions77 and lack of self-
doubt. To diminish the value enculturation aspects of public school education
may be to dispose of a rival of and countervailing influence upon such would-be
dictators.
The Supreme Court has recently shown signs of limited movement on the
scope of the legitimate functions of the public schools. In Bethel School District
No.403 v. Fraser,78 for example, the Court's majority was willing to itself charac-
terize the respondent speaker's remarks at a school assembly as offensively lewd,
indecent, and vulgar, even if not obscene.79 The Court might, in a less judicially
assertive moment, have relied more heavily on the reasonableness of such a char-
acterization by school officials themselves, but it at least avoided the relativism
with which it has, ineptly or not, decided other free speech cases in the past.80
In Fraser, the majority, finding offensiveness along with an absence of political
viewpoint discrimination, determined a sexually suggestive high school assembly
speech to be constitutionally unprotected against the school officials' determina-
tion that such a speech would, or did in fact, "undermine the school's basic
educational mission."8 1
It is possible that a future Court might drive a wedge between the essen-
tially physical disruption standard and the potentially broader "undermining of
basic educational mission" language in Fraser. The ideal test case would involve
non-lewd, non-indecent, non-vulgar speech or symbolic conduct that could rea-
sonably be thought to detectably undermine the school's basic and legitimate
educational mission, while at the same time not posing a substantial threat of an
actual physical disruption, i.e., a pure educational agenda control case.8 2
75. B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 141 (1980).
76. See Hafen, supra note 38, at 650.
77. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 156.
78. 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
79. See id. at 3166.
80. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), is a familiar example of the Court's invocation of
the undoubtedly true, but arguably irrelevant, observation that different people find different speech
offensive or distasteful.
81. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166.
82. One additional legitimate school function worthy of mention is that of promoting
lawabiding behavior among the students. See San Diego Committee Against Registration and the
Draft (CARD) v. Governing Board, 790 F.2d 1471, 1479 (9th Cir. 1986). In CARD, the Ninth
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V. THE PRESERVATION OF FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE CURRENT STUDENT
In a slightly, different context,8 3 it has been judicially observed that:
A State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop
the latent talents of its children but also in seeking to prepare them
for the life style that they may later choose, or at least to provide
them with an option other than the life they have led in the past.8 4
Our focus, in the matter of option provision or non-preclusion, of course extends
beyond recognizing such as merely a legitimate state interest and considers the
extent to which option provision through education rises to a constitutional
requirement derivable through the free speech clause.
In practice, there will be substantial overlap between a policy of providing
future life style options for students and a policy of ensuring no significant
impairment of future free speech capacities. These requirements are certainly
not identical in principle, as we can envision a person who can assume a variety
of less-demanding life roles without being capable of deploying unconstrainedly
a range of free speech-relevant capacities with reasonable fullness. Whether our
capacity impairment standard is more demanding, overall, than a principle of
preserving life style options is partly a matter of definition, and partly a matter
of empirical investigation.
While it is similarly possible to assert that a high school graduate with a
stunted, apparently permanently impaired free speech capacity is or may be a"good citizen," 85 it is certainly possible to extend the notion of good citizenship
to encompass more than merely not being a criminal, or voluntarily accepting a
status as a public welfare burden,8 6 by including a good citizenship requirement
of at least preserving one's option for intelligent, adaptable political participa-
tion. 87 Arguably, from the standpoint of society's interest in good citizenship, as
well as from that of the individual student's own present and future interest in
her future free speech capacities, "it is worse to restrict children's future oppor-
tunities against their will8 8 than it is to force them to keep their future options
open." 89 This follows in part from the relevant differences between schoolchil-
dren and adults discussed above.
Circuit found the threat of future illegal conduct by students in failing to register with Selective
Service to be too speculative to justify the school's exclusion of CARD materials. Actually, the
school's interest in this case should probably have been analyzed as the less speculative aim of not
abetting or cooperating with what it may have reasonably assumed to be an actual purpose of the
CARD organization of counseling failure to register. For an even more recent case with substantial
agenda-control features, see Burch v. Barker, 651 F. Supp. 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
83. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
84. Id. at 240 (White, J., concurring).
85. Cf id. at 212 (discussing desire of Amish to be good citizens, though at a level compatible
with modest education).
86. Cf id. at 224-25 (noting absence of evidence of any Amish tendency to become social
burdens).
87. Cf id. at 221 (discussing Jefferson's linkage of political participation and good citizenship).
Understandably, it has been argued that the educational standards set by the Court in Yoder, may be
too low to promote later "meaningful choice" in democratic society. See Gutmann, supra note 42, at
356.
88. Or even in accord with it, arguably.
89. Gutmann, supra note 42, at 355.
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How far we extend the principle of option preservation depends, though, on
whether we emphasize the societal interest or the individual rights interests of
each particular student. There is a lurking ambiguity in the claim that "[t]he
value of a liberal democracy to its citizens is in large part contingent upon the
ability of its citizens to exercise their political rights intelligently as well as to
choose among alternative conceptions of the good life." 90 A liberal democracy
can function effectively, and confer value on all persons, as long as the percent-
age of persons educated "to full and equal citizenship" 9' does not fall below
some minimum. Various students may be deprived of their free speech rights, in
view of their adult free speech incapacities, with the collective goal of liberal
democracy still being realized, if in obviously imperfect measure.
Interpreted stringently, the individual child's "right to an open future" 92 is
in some respects broader in its requirements than our interpretation of the free
speech clause in terms of future free speech capacity impairment. On a demand-
ing interpretation, it is possible to assert that it is in some measure the respon-
sibilty of, for example, the El Paso public system that most El Paso public school
students are never in a position to take a particular major world religion like
Shintoism seriously as a possible future life option. It remains possible to recon-
cile these standards either by interpreting the child's right to an open future less
strictly, or by determining, implausibly, that the practical inaccessibility of Shin-
toism must reflect a significant impairment in relevant free speech capacities.
VI. COERCIVE INDOCTRINATION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
It follows from our theory, perhaps controversially, that a government may
be guilty of an attempt to restrict a student's free speech rights impermissibly,
without succeeding in the attempt, and therefore, despite all the malice in the
world, not have violated the students' free speech rights. This is familiar in
other contexts. That killing someone may amount to the crime of homicide does
not in and of itself mean that an unsuccessful clear attempt to commit homicide
must necessarily be a crime, let alone the crime of homicide.
Similarly, on our theory, if the government has been sufficiently ineffective
in its attempt to violate student free speech rights, or if its actions without such a
suppressive intent are similarly inconsequential, there simply is no actionable
free speech violation. Moreover, it becomes possible for a potential intended or
unintended violation of a student's free speech rights to "turn out" to be not
actionable because any immediate effects may become neutralized over time,
leaving the student's free speech capacities unimpaired when she reaches
adulthood.
This temporal dimension, in which putative free speech violations may dis-
solve, is also not unfamiliar. We do not charge someone who pays in advance
for a future murder with any kind of homicide if, for some reason, the person he
90. Id. at 350.
91. Id. at 351.
92. VanGeel, supra note 69, at 261. Of course, an unduly strenuous interpretation of this
principle may run up against the fact that apparently any recognizable public school system would
tend, if only inadvertently, to effectively close off certain otherwise viable life alternatives through
their "hidden curricula" and unavoidable fostering of particular values. See Gutmann, supra note
42. at 352.
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has paid to commit the murder is somehow prevented from carrying out his
contract. But the analogy to "attempted" free speech violations, which may
even appear "successful" temporarily, is often underrecognized. It has been
urged, for example, that "the state may not attempt to coerce belief by the child,
because it would thereby abridge future freedom of choice." 93 But on our the-
ory, this would not necessarily follow, even if "attempt to" were omitted, and
the focus only on successful attempts. Attempts to coerce belief may completely
backfire, or otherwise go awry. They may also be merely partially or temporar-
ily effective such that no significant impairment of free speech capacities is
apparent once the child reaches the age of majority or leaves the school.
A coercively inculcated belief is therefore not necessarily a long-term or
undislodgeable belief. This is significant because, on our theory, the free speech
capacities of adults are far more constitutionally significant than those of the
same adults as schoolchildren, and the first amendment forbids precisely the
abridging of free speech rights, which literally excludes failed attempts to
abridge those rights from the scope of its coverage. 94
Unless one simply defines coercive inculcation of beliefs in terms of future
option closing, a uniform objection against all such coercion by the public
schools95 raises difficult empirical questions. Is it even possible for a society to
resist the understandable temptation to simply implant basic beliefs or attitudes
within the minds of its public schoolchildren, bypassing or simply not waiting
for the critical reflective capacities of such children? Is it perhaps true that some
or all children in fact require some minimal anchoring in basic beliefs not fully
critically examined if they are to develop a reasonably effective critical intelli-
gence? Is there perhaps some tradeoff between minimal coerced inculcation of
belief as a child and later resistance as an adult to propagandizing? More exoti-
cally, is it possible that one coercive childhood experience may "offset," or be
offset by, another such experience?9 6
In any event, it seems clear from casual observation that persons may be
both reasonably free speech competent as adults and yet have been subject to
evidently permanent, coercive, reason-bypassing indoctrination as a schoolchild.
Any normative theory to the effect that any non-rational indoctrination of
schoolchildren violates the free speech clause 97 should confront not only the
empirical issues raised immediately above,98 but the limited relevance of genuine
autonomy concerns to schoolchildren, in light of their not yet developed capaci-
ties, and their dependence on the no more autonomy-respecting process of
socialization through parents.
Our view of the legitimate role of educational coercion might also be con-
93. Garvey, supra note 1I, at 350.
94. It might be argued that a government that once, or repeatedly, sought unsuccessfully to
abridge a person's free speech rights, at some cost to that person, was violating the person's right to
equal protection of the laws.
95. See VanGeel, supra note 69, at 253, 261.
96. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 159, for a discussion of the possibility of what might be
called countervailing intolerances.
97. See VanGeel, supra note 69, at 261, Garvey, supra note 11, at 327.
98. Not entirely frivolously, it might be asked why compulsory public school courses in
mathematics do not tend to coercively inculcate values associated with "mere linear rationality" that
may well not be uniformly shared by parents of public school students.
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trasted with the broader view espoused by Professor Ackerman, who argues that
adults may coercively inculcate certain adult norms if such is necessary to mini-
mize the probability or severity of criminal law restraints being required to con-
trol the child later.99 This broader view, despite its undoubted libertarian intent,
might of course in principle be used to justify an unexpected degree of counse-
quentialist state intervention into such matters as the watching of television vio-
lence. Our focus is narrower in that preventing future criminality by even the
least intrusive means may license more intrusive restraints than our requirement
of the preservation of future free speech capacities.
Judicially, there have been attempts to distinguish between a school's instil-
ling values through "choice of emphasis" on the one hand, and by "shielding"
students from disfavored ideas on the other.1OO Alternatively, it has been urged
that "[s]chool boards may establish their curriculum in such a way as to trans-
mit community values ... but ... may not deny access to ideas in a way that
prescribes an orthodoxy in matters of opinion."10 1 Tests such as these may have
some sorting power, but they quickly become merely alternative ways of charac-
terizing essentially the same phenomenon 0 2 or educational technique. Under
our capacity impairment test, as we have seen, some degree of "shielding" may
be permissible under the free speech clause, while it is possible that broad and
extreme "emphasis" may sometimes not.
The Court has also shown some attraction for an argument in the following
terms: "That [the schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for
scrupulous protection of constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not
to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important
principles of our government as mere platitudes."' 0 3 At least the last clause of
this sentence is supported by Dean Levin, who argues that "if the educational
institution is wholly undemocratic, students are likely to get mixed signals with
regard to the democratic values needed to function as citizens in our society:
The way in which school administrators operate schools may have a more pow-
erful influence on students than the lessons in their civic textbooks. ' 1' 4
The strangulation argument, at least at a literal level, overlooks the possibil-
ity that a school may reasonably presume that, despite the absence of govern-
mental hinderance or constraint, an untutored, undeveloped mind is essentially
not yet a politically "free" mind in the relevant sense. And that a young student
eventually may take most significant advantage of her free speech rights as an
adult only if she is subject to broad, reasonable restrictions on her present incli-
nations as a child to do such things as engage in political protest, or its sem-
blance, during class.
Similarly, while we obviously do not want to preach the value of free speech
99. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 75, at 147-48.
100. Pico, 457 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
101. Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939, 944 (D. Vt. 1986).
102. An interesting test case would be a school system that implicitly "prescribed," allegedly, an
"orthodoxy" of some of patriotic feeling or opinion, in ways that avoided the dramatic spectacle of
coerced flag salutes by those objecting on religious grounds, as in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
103. Id. at 637, quoted in Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 and Pico, 457 U.S. at 864-65 (plurality
opinion).
104. Levin, supra note 10, at 1649.
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and political democracy to children while hypocritically violating those princi-
ples in our classroom dealings with them, we must not simply beg the issue by
assuming that free speech in the schoolroom should be analyzed along the lines
of free speech in the union hall, or on the picket line, or that democracy in a
classroom must extend as far as it might in other institutional contexts. We must
discern the scope of children's free speech rights-the point at issue-before
knowing whether we are setting a bad example, or simply adhering sensibly to
the purpose-driven legitimate scope of those principles. There may be relevant
distinctions to be drawn between minor children in a public school and adults
generally.
VII. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDENT'S RIGHT TO KNOW
PARTICULAR THINGS
Our theory includes some free speech clause limitations on the unwilling-
ness of schools to instruct. But it is reasonable to ask whether a student could
ever have a free speech right that certain identifiable facts, principles, theories,
or values be taught to him. One possible answer is that "[t]he right to know
should not impose an affirmative obligation on the state to provide specific infor-
mation; the better role for free speech is to restrict attempts by the state to
coerce belief or to forbid the acquisition of knowledge. Affirmative provision of
information seems better left to parents."'o 5
The analysis is a bit different, however, under our theory. It seems correct
that there is no general constitutional right of public school students under the
free speech clause to specific, identifiable bits of information or perspectives. But
there is an obvious free speech basis, under our significant future free speech
capacity impairment test, for requiring the school to impart some broadly con-
tent-variable irreducible minimum quantity and variety of arguably basic infor-
mation, theories, and viewpoints. The school may not simply assume that this
minimum nutrition for developing free speech capacities is coming from some
other source, such as the family.
There may, as an empirical matter, be some particular ideas that seem so
fundamental and inescapable that the school's failure to in any way present
them, even briefly, may be most plausibly explained on the basis of the school's
desire to impair, or its indifference towards the impairment of, free speech
capacity development. 10 6 The idea of the very existence of the United States as
a nation-state would seem to fall into this category. Another such individually
necessary particular idea may be that adult Americans are widely thought to
hold, descriptively or normatively, defensible free speech rights. It is difficult to
imagine some set of different ideas which, if conveyed to the student, would
sufficiently compensate for the absence of the above ideas. Under our theory,
therefore, there is probably some limit to the variability of the various sets of
basic ideas, that when imparted to the student will suffice to avoid the relevant
capacity impairmment, which supplies in turn a principled limitation on the
105. Garvey, supra note 11, at 374.
106. Cf. Levin, supra note 10, at 1660, 1666 (discussing limitations on the discretion of teachers
in selecting ideas to be presented).
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scope of the student's free speech right to know particular things. 107
It is possible to seek to expand the student's free speech right to know par-
ticular things by appealing to the fact that motivation enhances learning, and
that some matters, such as sex in general, are of greater intrinsic interest to
schoolchildren than other matters.10 8 But as fascinating as such subjects may
be, as indicated by the ample time devoted to them by adolescents outside of
class, it may be difficult to show significant future free speech capacity impair-
ment because of the exclusion of such particular matters from the curriculum.
An individual school might plausibly maintain that it prefers to impart the
lessons that interests and tastes in conversational subject matter need not be
brute, but can be cultivated. Or it may teach that classroom discussion of such
matters undermines the importance of developing dispassionate, impersonal ana-
lytical and expository skills that draw upon statistical, rather than anecdotal or
introspective evidence. It is far from clear, as we shall discuss further below,
that the federal courts should be in the business of simply second-guessing such
pedagogy in the absence of other legal considerations.
An interesting variant of the particular item of knowledge problem con-
cerns the permissibility of a school system's entirely closing or failing to furnish,
for reasons other than an actual lack of resources, any sort of school library or
close substitute therefor. To some, such an action by the school board would be
entirely unproblematic. Chief Justice Burger, for example, wrote that "[o]f
course, it is perfectly clear that, unwise as it would be, the board could wholly
dispense with the school library, so far as the first amendment is concerned." 10 9
Under our theory, however, we must at least hold open the possibility that
such a board decision, perhaps in conjunction with other decisions, could have
the effect, whether intended or not, of causing significant relevant capacity
impairment. The absence of any sort of school library or its equivalent puts
some strain on the classroom teaching component of the development of free
speech capacities. While our focus is on effects, rather than the school board's
intentions, we may wish to trace effects through intended effects, and we are
properly constitutionally curious about, for example, a school with ample space
and resources for at least an informal library that refuses all donations. 110
VIII. STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF
BYSTANDER STUDENTS
The Supreme Court in Tinker required, for free speech protection, that the
student speech not only not materially disrupt classes, but also that it not rise to
the level of "an invasion of the rights of others."111 The precise character of the
rights referred to, or the nature of the invasion, was not definitively specified, but
the Court evidently found some relevance in its conclusion that the petitioners in
107. Cf. Freeman, supra note 31, at 44 (maintaining the illimitability in principle of any such
right).
108. See Garvey, supra note 11, at 348.
109. Pico, 457 U.S. at 887 n.3 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Diamond, supra note 24, at 511
n.145.
110. Cf. Levin, supra note 10, at 1659 (discussing the absence of any constitutional mandate of
any school library at all).
111. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
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Tinker had not "sought to intrude in the ... lives of others." 112
While it seems possible in some sense to intrude into the lives of other stu-
dents without thereby necessarily committing an actionable, tortious invasion of
their legal rights, there has in fact been some support for the view that the
rights-invasion branch of Tinker is or should be confined to tortious right inva-
sions.11 3 The Supreme Court's recent willingness in Fraser to permit sanctions
imposed on students for lewd, vulgar, potentially offensive language in the pres-
ence of at best equivocal evidence of class disruption, 14 suggests that the pres-
ent Court majority may not be willing to confine the rights-invasion prong of
Tinker to conduct amounting to a tort against fellow students.
Our approach, which allows restriction of student speech in the absence of
relevant capacity impairment, assuming some reasonable and legitimate state
interest in the restriction, allows the school system to make the following kind of
argument with respect to the interests of third-party students: in the school's
conscientious determination, some or all students of a particular age and grade
risk being exposed to unnecessary, unjustifiable psychological harms, even if
such exposure is non-tortious, such as being called on to voluntarily complete
frank sexual questionaires, or become accurately informed of the collective
results of a sampling, representative or not, of her peers, who may well set the
chief standard of normalcy for her.' 15 In a given case, the risk of even non-
tortious psychological harm to young students might be thought to outweigh the
contribution of the speech potentially inflicting such harm to the free speech
capacity development of the speaker and audience.
Whether an interpretation that equates the "rights invasion" justification
for restricting student speech rights with "tortious rights invasion" allows
greater predictability and provides clearer guidance to school administrators is
in practice unclear. It may also not minimize the school's litigation expenses.
Simply referring to the tort-nontort distinction as a "previously defined"" 6 legal
standard does not imply that a typical school administrator will be any better at
predicting whether a reviewing court will pronounce the conduct tortious, in a
common close case, than she might be at determining significant free speech
capacity impairment. Additionally, the tortious conduct standard for rights
invasion still requires the school to spend resources in common borderline tort
cases defending suits by either alleged tort victims of the speech or by speakers
or listeners if the school determines the speech restrictions to be justified. The
school's litigation expenses would likely be minimized by a broad prior restraint
rule, with necessary allowances for the presumably rare case of future free
speech capacities' being significantly impaired.
Finally, it has been argued, in effect, that the actionable tort standard has
the advantage, over a more subjective or less judicially guided standard, of lend-
ing itself less easily to a process of cementing arbitrary middle-class values into
112. Id. at 514.
113. See Kuhimeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375-76 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No.86-836); Note, Administrative Regulation of the
High School Press, 83 MICH. L. REV. 625, 640-41 (1984) (discussing Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d
512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978)).
114. See Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165-66.
115. See Note, supra note 113, at 640.
116. Id. at 641.
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the notion of not offending or intruding upon the broad rights of others. 117 But
one lesson schools should feel constitutionally free to impart is that one's own,
or a majority's, sensibilities may not be the only consideration in determining
the offensiveness of a possible speech. Without imposing merely parochial stan-
dards, there seems no convincing basis in free speech law to proscribe imparting
some arguably "middle class" values, such as, for example, the importance of
"book learning."
IX. PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS AND STUDENT SPEECH
A number of recent judicial opinions have suggested that distinctive pro-
gress can be made in resolving a variety of public school student speech cases
through applying the three-part forum analysis emphasized by the Supreme
Court in recent cases such as Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Association118 and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund. 19 In this general context, the Court has sought to distinguish "quintes-
sential" or historic public forums, such as streets and parks; limited purpose or
government designated public forums; and non-public forums. Generally, the
rigidity of the standards constitutionally imposed on government restriction of
speech decreases in the order described. With regard to non-public forums, for
example, the Court has held that "[c]ontrol over access to a non-public forum
can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions
drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are view-
point neutral."120 In the case of designated forums, however, the Court has
determined that "when the Government has intentionally designated a place or
means of communication as a public forum speakers cannot be excluded without
a compelling governmental interest."121 With regard to designated forums, "a
content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling
state interest."' 12 2
Public forum analysis provokes more questions than can immediately be
judicially answered. The doctrine as a general instrument has its detractors, both
judicial' 23 and academic. 124 Regardless of the doctrine's possible merits in gen-
eral, its application in the public school cases amounts to the use of a rather
blunt, or amorphous, instrument to do a refined, delicate job.
It is problematic, for example, how typical kinds of school newspapers
117. Cf Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1363, rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (discussing the risks of cementing
such standards in place). See also Note, Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel School District and
Regulation of Speech in the Public Schools, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1164, 1186.
118. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). See also Searcey v. Crim, 642 F. Supp. 313, 315 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd
in part and vacated in part, 815 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1987),
119. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985).
120. Id. at 3451.
121. Id. at 3448.
122. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
123. See Cornelius, 105 S. Ct. at 3466 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing a degree of skepticism
as to the distinctive actual utility of forum analysis in resolving cases).
124. See, e.g., Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis.- Content and
Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1223-24 (1984) (expressing
skepticism as to whether forum analysis in general concentrates attention on the significant values
and interests at stake).
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should be categorized on this schema. San Diego Committee Against Registra-
tion and the Draft (CARD) v. Governing Board 123 involved typical circum-
stances. In this case, the court on appeal held, on the basis of a detailed factual
examination of the operation, policies, functioning, lines of authority, practices
and procedures, and the authorizing statements and institutional relationships of
the school newspaper, that the newspaper fell into the second forum category,
that of designated fora, rather than the third category, or non-public fora.126
It might well be reasonable to conclude, however, that most ordinary public
school newspapers produced with the efforts and support of both school officials
and the students, whether the newspapers are narrowly curricular or cour-
sework-oriented or otherwise tightly administratively controlled, simply do not
fit neatly into any of the three forum categories; however, they may ultimately
be defined, and whether we take this to be a matter of law or of fact.
Most ordinary school newspapers are intended for public, or at least broad
intra-school dissemination, unlike the fora or means of communication of the
pure third, non-public category. But they are also importantly intended to train
authoritatively the students involved, to supplement and advance the school's
pedagogical aims, and generally to impart educational lessons, whether or not
they are also intended to serve as a more or less broadly open forum for the
expression of the views of students, or outsiders, on a broad range of topics. The
reasons counseling against a requirement of viewpoint neutrality in each class,
or in the school in general, also apply in the context of most student newspapers
produced under the school's auspices. There is no free speech requirement that
all public schools make concessions, for example, to social disintegration and
fragmentation, such that to promote interracial harmony within a school news-
paper is to "open the door" to a demand for fair presentation of the opposite
point of view. 127 A school's refusal to publish such views in the school newspa-
per may be satisfactorily explained not on the basis of viewpoint discrimination,
but on evident educational unsuitability and incompatibility with the basic mis-
sions of the public schools and the education of minor children.
While school newspapers are perhaps the most common organized means
of expression generating student speech cases, a number of cases have grappled
with student speech issues in the context of school plays. In Seyfried v. Wal-
ton, 128 for example, the court on appeal sought to draw a distinction between
non-program related student newspaper expressions of opinion on the one hand,
and voluntary but more narrowly curricular activities, such as the school play
involved in Seyfried, on the other. 129 Speech expression in the latter context was
thought to be properly subject to broader regulation.130 It is difficult to believe,
though, that it is best to ground major differences in free speech rights on only
125. 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986).
126. Id. at 1476. See also Kuhimeier, 795 F.2d at 1371-74, 1378.
127. Cf. 790 F.2d at 1481; Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist., 776 F.2d
431, 437 (3d Cir. 1985) ("[v]iewpoint discrimination, of course, is impermissible regardless of the
nature of the forum"). By way of contrast, consider Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863
(9th Cir. 1982) (student newspaper found to be curricular; a vehicle for imparting journalism class
skills and values such as accuracy and fairness).
128. 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981).
129. Id. at 216.
130. Id.
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the minimal, if not utterly elusive, distinctions in tightness of integration of a
particular school program or activity into the narrowly conceived curriculum of
the school - e.g., that some newspapers, produced even in journalism class per-
haps, must be left relatively unconstrained, but a play produced in theater class
need not.
The logic of Seyfried was rejected in favor of an even less satisfactory
approach in Bowman v. Bethel-Tate Board of Education.131 In Bowman, the
district court enjoined the school board's halting of a play to be presented by a
group of third graders at a parent-teacher association meeting. The court
focused on the voluntary character of the children's participation, and charac-
terized the board's rejection of the play, for allegedly glorifying cowardice, deni-
grating patriotism, and disparaging the aged, not as a rejection based on
educational unsuitability, but as an attempt to suppress the expression of disfa-
vored ideas. Stopping the play was analogized to the removal of a book from the
shelves of the school library.132
Realistically, it may be doubted whether the eight year old children in Bow-
man in fact wanted to express, or even understood, the particular ideas in ques-
tion, as opposed to simply wanting to be in the play, voluntarily or at parental
behest. Similarly, even purely voluntary school activities may be intended by the
school officials to impart particular ideas or build particular skills. The school in
this instance may quite reasonably have wanted to avoid giving offense to even a
minority of parents at the parent-teacher association meeting. There is a vital
difference between the free speech rights of adults to speak offensively, and those
of eight year olds to speak offensively, or to say things that unintentionally give
offense. The former may be truly a necessary evil, the latter an ordinarily unjus-
tifiable one.
While it is perfectly sensible to argue that the better analogy to stopping
production of a play is to stopping midway through the process of ordering a
library book, rather than removing it from the shelves, 133 this kind of argument
misses the fundamental problem of the logic of Bowman. This is simply that we
do, or should, care far more in the free speech context about the impact of any
imposed restrictions on the future selves of the eight year olds than about any
immediate free speech effects on the children themselves, as eight year old
schoolchildren.
X. THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND EXPERTISE
Proper resolution of student speech cases is unlikely on a consistent basis
unless some care is taken in attending to the precise relative advantages and
competencies of judges, local and national experts of various sorts, and demo-
cratically elected school officials and their agents. It will not suffice to character-
ize the crucial issue as "whether local schools are to be administered by elected
school boards, or by federal judges and teenage pupils. ... -134 There is doubt-
less merit, within its proper scope, to the judicial tradition of deference to the
131. 610 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1985), vacated mem., 798 F.2d 468 (6th Cir. 1986).
132. See id. at 579-81.
133. A diversity of Supreme Court opinion is expressed on this point in Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982).
134. Id. at 885 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 22:59
ROLE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
management discretion of local school authorities, who may be both popularly
elected and particularly familiar with the values and preferences of the local
community, in addition to having familiarity with the operation of local peda-
gogical practices.1 35 But, while under our theory judicial intervention into stu-
dent speech issues will presumably be rare, the logic of deference is an
incomplete and misleading explanation for this result.
To begin with, while "American public education has always been under
local political control ".... 136 the scope, applicability, and infringement of free
speech rights are matters that are intended precisely not to be subject to local
majoritarian control. Under our theory, the significant impairment of students'
future free speech capacities cannot be justified by any mere preferences and
insights of local officials, or local values, no matter how popular or otherwise
reasonable. The presumed advantage in understanding first amendment law
must go to the federal courts, even if one assumes that the compatibility of local
federal judges' values with those of the populace in general played no role in
their selection. Of course, matters of educational pedagogy, and the actual
impact of a given school curriculum on local students, may be crucial under our
theory in deciding a given case.
It is doubtful, however, whether a member of even a distant United States
Supreme Court, being well-briefed and benefitting from the views of local as well
as leading national experts, in the record or via the briefs filed, and with an
opportunity to pose questions on oral argument, is really at a disadvantage com-
pared to local political decisionmakers on matters even of educational theory,
psychology, and cognitive development. It may be unrealistic to assume that
local officials understood the impact of their curricular policies on their students
in a way that is simply not communicable to the justices who must decide the
case. With or without such mechanisms as amicus briefs, the judiciary may be
in at least as good a position to draw upon and comprehend the range of relevant
national expertise as the local decisionmakers were in at the time of their deci-
sion.137 Even if we assume infinite conscientiousness on the part of local deci-
sionmakers, even the most distinctively non-legal issues may not be particularly
local in nature.
Even if these considerations were of no effect, it would still be important to
note that our approach to student speech tends to minimize the risks of inappro-
priate judicial intrusion. It is plausible to argue that a distant judiciary may"miss" some subtle classroom distraction or interference with the classroom
learning process. 138 It is less plausible to maintain that the distant judiciary will
tend to commit the opposite error, of "hallucinating" some imagined significant
free speech capacity impairment that is not really present, for reasons under-
stood by local officials but incomprehensible to the judiciary. If the students
cannot, at graduation,139 describe the American political process, for example,
135. See Fraser, 755 F.2d at 1368 (Wright, J., dissenting), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986);
Diamond, supra note 24, at 482, 498-500; Freeman, supra note 31, at 69-70.
136. Diamond, supra note 24, at 498.
137. But cf Tushnet, supra note 40, at 754 (inevitability of judicial reliance upon professionals in
areas where social science evidence is important).
138. See Diamond, supra note 24, at 497.
139. There seems no reason not to toll the statute of limitations in such cases until graduation or
the age of majority, to allow both parties the best opportunity to build a concrete case.
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in any rudimentary way, the judiciary may rightly be impatient of esoteric expla-
nations by school officials of why this is inevitable.
There are thus insufficient grounds for concluding that "courts should
apply only a limited standard of review to local school administration action:
the minimum rationality standard currently used to review government activity
that does not implicate fundamental rights."t 40 Fundamental rights, though of
a limited scope, are indeed involved. While "contemporary community stan-
dards"'14 1 have an undoubted role to play in first amendment adjudication, there
is not much point to constitutional protection if they are invariably decisive,'4 2
or if any minimal legitimate public purpose trumps the free speech right.
It should be noted that our cases differ in a number of respects from the due
process cases the Court has confronted in which, for example, a student has been
dismissed from college or professional school for reasons of alleged deficiencies
in academic or professional performance.143 Even if the right to remain in medi-
cal school except for legitimate reasons were of the same constitutional moment
as the right to freedom of speech, we would expect greater judicial deference to
the conscientious efforts of colleges of medicine to sort out marginal doctors
than we would in the more accessibly common-sensical inquiries our free speech
rule would require.
Finally, despite the expressions of deference to the discretion of local polit-
ical decision-makers, the courts have at least occasionally been willing, in small
cases and great, to in effect overrule the pedagogical judgment of local officials in
the context of a significant rights violation. In Meyer v. Nebraska,144 for exam-
ple, the Court, without citation to the record or to any authority, concluded,
contrary to the evident determination of Nebraska authorities, that "[i]t is well
known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed
at an early age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health,
morals or understanding of the ordinary child."145 The Court in effect constitu-
tionally overrode a collective decision by the State to allow the study of
languages such as Greek and Latin, but not German and French, during the
early grades, despite whatever pedagogical arguments the school might have
mustered.
More importantly, it is possible to interpret the landmark case of Brown v.
Board of Education 146 as implying a judicial willingness to implicitly overrule
the determination by local school officials that the quality of education for black
children - and perhaps this could be translated into terms of the significant
impairment of the general future capacities of current black students - was not
140. Diamond, supra note 24, at 477.
141. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) which, in the context of obscenity, leaves open
the issue of the relationship between community standards and any "saving" serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value in the allegedly obscene work.
142. Cf Diamond, supra note 24, at 507-08 (discussing conflicting roles of community standards
and non-majoritarianism in first amendment adjudication).
143. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (no violation of due process
when respondent was fully informed of faculty dissatisfaction with her academic performance prior
to dismissal).
144. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
145. Id. at 403. See also Garvey, supra note 11, at 343.
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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being significantly impaired in a constitutionally suspect way under the estab-
lished school system.147
The case for only limited intervention by the courts into the operations of
the public schools in student speech cases thus need not rely heavily on consider-
ations of deference and comparative expertise. Overruling the judgment of the
relevant Topeka officials on the largely empirical matter of the development of
the educational capacities of black students was not thought to by itself be hope-
lessly complex or illegitimate in Brown. It is not the commands of judicial defer-
ence, but the narrow legitimate scope of the free speech rights of public
schoolchildren, that best justifies only infrequent judicial intervention in public
school decisions regarding the rights of juveniles under the free speech clause.
Under our substantial future free speech capacity impairment test, as outlined
above, the courts may intervene to vindicate genuine deprivations of student free
speech rights, while respecting the proper scope of discretion of democratically
elected local educational authorities.
147. Cf Diamond, supra note 24, at 507-09 (emphasizing the considerations favoring greater
judicial deference toward local school board determinations generally).
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